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RECOMMENDATIONS
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association urges early agree-
ment between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and Warsaw Pact
countries to reduce levels of conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association supports
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations to reduce levels of NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe from current levels to parity.
REPORT
Although years of negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
(MBFR) failed to produce a conventional arms control agreement, recent events
have been more auspicious.
In May 1986, NATO foreign ministers meeting in Halifax called for strength-
ened security and stability in the whole of Europe at lower levels of conventional
forces. The next month, the Warsaw Pact issued its Budapest Appeal which
called for conventional force cuts from the "Atlantic to the Urals," a much
broader area than the MBFR zone.
The MBFR negotiations failed in large part because the United States and the
Soviet Union could not agree on the extent of Soviet superiority in conventional
arms. Recent developments have demonstrated a narrowing of that disagreement.
In March 1989, members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact began
expanded negotiations to reduce conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE).
The Western proposal, which has become the basis for negotiations, calls for
establishment of equal NATO-Warsaw Pact ceilings on key types of equipment
that can be used for aggressive purposes. Beyond eliminating key Warsaw Pact
military advantages, the Western approach to CFE would reduce the capability to
initiate surprise attacks and large-scale offensive actions or to use military forces
for political intimidation.
In a May 11, 1989 Moscow meeting with Secretary Baker, Soviet President
Gorbachev presented specific numerical ceilings indicating willingness to accept
greater reductions than ever before. These figures were formally tabled just
before the NATO summit.
President Bush concluded that the specific Warsaw Pact proposals reflected
tacit Eastern acceptance of the Western concept and framework for CFE, and
*This Recommendation and Report was adopted by the House of Delegates in November 1989.
The Recommendation and Report was prepared by the Committee on Arms Control and Disarma-
ment. Chairman Thomas Graham was the initiator of the Recommendation and Report.
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